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PROPERTY – APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court examined a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's 
jurisdiction on grounds that a failure to raise the issue of damages in a summary eviction proceeding in 
justice court precluded a landlord from subsequently seeking damages in district court. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court denied the petitioner’s writ of mandamus. Although all the elements of claim 
preclusion were met, the Court held the statute’s legislative intent, determined by application of reason 
and public policy, created an exemption to claim preclusion for landlords seeking summary eviction. 
 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Petitioner G.C. Wallace, Inc. (Wallace) defaulted on its monthly rent payments to Reef Centra 
Point B2348, Inc. (Reef Centra). After obtaining a summary eviction order in justice court, Reef Centra 
filed a subsequent complaint in district court for over $50,000 in damages for Wallace's breach of the 
lease agreement. In Wallace’s motion for summary judgment, Wallace asserted a damages action was 
barred by claim preclusion because Reef Centra did not raise the issue of damages together with the 
summary eviction, either in justice court or in district court. The district court denied summary 
judgment for Wallace. Wallace then petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to 
vacate the order denying summary judgment. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Chief Justice Saitta authored the opinion for the unanimous, three-justice panel.  The Court 
began by examining the standards for writ relief.  Generally, an appeal is considered an “adequate and 
speedy remedy” foreclosing the availability of writ relief.2 However, the Supreme Court has discretion 
to consider writ relief challenging a denial of summary judgment if: (1) there is no factual dispute and 
summary judgment is required by statute or rule; or (2) there is an important issue of law requiring 
clarification and judicial economy favors granting writ relief.
3
 The Supreme Court determined that 
Wallace raised several important issues regarding summary eviction and that judicial economy 
warranted the Court’s consideration of those issues because they were likely to recur. 
 
 Wallace claimed the district court’s denial of summary judgment was an abuse of discretion 
because the doctrine of claim preclusion prevented Reef Centra from bringing a separate damages 
action in district court after obtaining a summary eviction in justice court under the same facts. The 
Court agreed the elements of claim preclusion were met, finding that: (1) the parties in both actions 
were identical; (2) the justice court’s summary eviction was a valid final judgment; and (3) contrary to 
Reef Centra’s assertions, the justice court’s $10,000 jurisdictional limitation did not prevent Reef 
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Centra from bringing its damages claim in justice court. 
 
 Although claim preclusion would normally prevent Reef Centra’s subsequent damages action, 
an exception to claim preclusion applies when it appears “from a consideration of the entire statutory 
scheme that litigation, which on ordinary analysis might be considered objectionable as repetitive, is 
here intended to be permitted.”4 The Court found the statutory language governing summary eviction5 
was ambiguous because it reasonably allowed for conflicting interpretations as to whether a damages 
claim must be brought at the same time as a summary eviction proceeding. Furthermore, examination 
of the legislative history provided no conclusive indication of the Legislature’s intent on the issue. 
Therefore, the Court determined the legislative intent by construing NRS 40.253 in accordance with 
reason and public policy. 
 
 Because NRS 40.253 provides a “swift and straightforward procedure for determining who is 
entitled to immediate possession,” a requirement to litigate all claims arising from default would defeat 
the very purpose of the statute. Such a requirement would force landlords to either “forego the speedy 
resolution of possession in justice court or forfeit their claims for damages in excess of $10,000.” 
Furthermore, the litigation of all claims would place a heavy burden on the district court while 
underutilizing the justice court. Therefore, a statutory interpretation consistent with reason and public 
policy must allow a landlord to bring a summary eviction action in justice court without preventing the 
landlord’s subsequent claim for damages, whether in justice court or district court. The order denying 
summary judgment for Wallace was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.  Therefore, the Court 
upheld the denial of summary judgment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The statutory scheme in NRS 40.253 indicates a legislative intent to permit an exception to the 
doctrine of claim preclusion in an action for summary eviction. A landlord, after seeking summary 
eviction in justice court, may properly bring a subsequent action for damages in either justice court or 
district court. 
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